戈叔亚的博客
凤凰博报 由你开始
http://blog.ifeng.com/1814067.html
发表 管理 分类 简介 头像 功能 音乐 友情链接 模板 个性域名

美军资料“松山战斗”

2016-03-19 16:37:07 编辑 删除

归档在 我的博文 | 浏览 6193 次 | 评论 0 条

摘自:美国军在第二次世界大战的中缅印战区

中缅印战区战史从书

第三部分




松山战斗

   自从中国人试图直捣怒江战线的中心龙陵的战斗失败以后,中国指挥官就将注意力从龙陵转移到了松山。(注75)松山是由许多个山头组成,位于怒江西岸的滇缅公路旁边,这样就直接阻止了中国试图利用公路的用意。中国人在这里投入了大量兵力,包括开始在龙陵方面作战的部队。这些部队都是由空投来提供给养和装备,由于这些中国部队是在松山和龙陵之间,所以仅仅是空投是不够的,必须将在松山的日本军清除掉。

松山(中文意思是长满松树的山)是坐落在怒江峡谷的一座海拔3,000英尺的地形复杂的群

山。从地图上看大约是一个不等边的三角形。缠绕在怒江峡谷之间的滇缅公路,从这个三角形的东北慢慢到了正北面形成尖角,然后沿着西北下滑。日本军在松山控制的滇缅公路大约有36英里。时间不允许再修一条绕过松山的公路。日本人的防御系统是在金光惠次郎少校(Maj. Keijiro Kanemitsu)指挥下的1,200名士兵,是第113联队的基本部队,并得到了一个山地炮兵营和一些运输部队和一些工程人员的支持。1,200人中,作战人员有900名。

   6月,怒江战役已经展开了一段时间,中国人使用150毫米榴弹炮7门、75毫米榴弹炮2门和76毫米榴弹炮2门开始对松山猛烈开火。以后一些pack artillery(驮载火炮)炮也参加炮击,这些炮兵得到了一名坐在观测飞机里的美国炮兵观测员的指示,这样中国炮兵和由金光惠次郎少校指挥的日本炮兵开始了较量。不久终于将日本炮兵给压制下去了。在滇缅公路上,工程人员和中国人开始重新修理跨越怒江的桥梁。由于现在比较安全,工程人员可以从容工作。同时中国军新28师和新39师组织了团一级的对松山的攻势。6月15日,他们成功地攻占了这个三角形东南角的一个山头,但是他们在攻占两英里开外的西南角时却失败了。其他中国部队在付出了惨重代价后,攻势也失败了。


日本南方军司令官寺内寿一视察松山

寺内照片的拍摄原地

日军113联队举行部队成立一周年纪念日

拍摄原地

日本随军记者在松山拍摄的腾冲民工修筑滇缅公路纪念碑

纪念碑残破




   在包围着松山准备着下一次的攻势时,由于第8军的到来,使卫立煌将军的兵力得到了加强。第8军下辖荣誉第一师、82师和103师,最初他们驻防在印度支那(越南——云南)边境。当中国军插到龙陵的背后时,他们就赶来增援。第8军有一些租借法案的装备,但是只有三分之二的军官受过Y-FOS的训练。由于这个军的荣誉第一师第三团赶来,减轻了新28师的压力,因为这个师在6月27日的一次失败的协同攻击后,日本人反而夺回了新28师在这个月不久前得到的地盘。同时日本人还渗透到了中国防线中来减轻松山的压力,为了进一步加强松山的阵地,6月28日,日本飞机3架战斗机和2架运输机来到松山盘旋并投掷物品,结果一部分落到了中国人的手里。

   在由CarlosG. Spaht上校指挥下的Y-FOS人员的陪伴下,第8军于7月5日从东面和南面开始了对松山的进攻。中国的炮兵经过了彻夜的炮火装备,7月5日凌晨,两个团的中国部队开始了进攻。由于兵力不足,虽然部分日本人的阵地被占领,但是日本人马上组织反击,结果到了黄昏,中国人在损失了70多人的情况下,又回到了原来的阵地。Carlos G. Spaht上校向窦恩报告,攻击部队和偷袭部队的配合非常糟糕(that teamwork between the demolition squadsand the assault teams had left much to be desired),要求这样的训练必须马上加强。

   7月7-8日,第8军组织了246团的进攻,这个攻势是在这个三角形的西南角进行,这个进攻使得这个叫做滚龙坡的日本守军感到惊讶。到了午夜,中国人几乎将所有的日本要点都拿了下来,但是就在这个午夜不久,日本人又开始在他们熟悉的地形开始反击,246团在伤亡了200多人后还是被赶了下来。Y-FOS的观察员报告说,中国人对于夜间战斗一个接着一个感到相当疑惑。所以246团不得不将阵地交给了307团。7月10日和12日,307团对面着的又是日本人新的防御战术。中国人一直都是成群地沿着容易上山的路线向山头发起攻击,日本人用他们的机关枪打得中国人一群群拥挤地到山头与山头之间的凹地躲避,然后日本人就向这些中国士兵投掷手榴弹和迫击炮弹。很遗憾,日本人这样的战术非常有效,结果第8军不得不再派另外一个团来增援遭受巨大损失的307团(103师)。

   在第8军开始攻击松山以来,两个星期过去了。现在,这样一个团或者两个团的攻击方式要改变,7月23日,军部将榴弹炮运到日本人阵地1,500-3,000码的距离内进行直接射击。而同时使用3个团的兵力组织进攻,103师师长指挥着75毫米的榴弹炮射击,有时候炮弹就在距离进攻中的中国士兵前方25-40码的前方爆炸。缴获的日本人的日记里有赞扬中国人的103师勇敢炮兵的记载。这是指挥很好、协同很好的成功的进攻,结果中国人几乎完全占领了滚龙坡和大垭口这两个日本人的山头阵地。7月26日,惊恐的金光惠次郎少佐要求日本战斗机来支援,要他们攻击中国人的炮兵阵地,这些大炮一直的没有隐蔽地露天放着进行直接射击。结果,日本人的战斗机马上作出了敏捷地反应,他们使用机关枪猛烈地扫射中国的炮兵。在8月3日之前,巨大的伤亡对中国人一个星期一直保持着的进攻的士气是一个打击。

   当8月3日308团来增援重新组织进攻时,狠狠打击了日本人的投掷手,因为他们的破坏性很大,结果占领了滚龙坡最高点。在那里,中国人发现了几辆日本人的小坦克,这些小坦克是被放在挖掘的阵地内当作地堡用的。日本人一旦失败,会马上组织反击,Y-FOS的参谋人员猜想敌人的弹药一定短缺了。结果的确是这样,金光少佐决定奇袭第8军的炮兵阵地和供给品来补给自己。8月9日夜间,日本人组织了7个志愿敢死队,他们捣毁了一些榴弹炮并从阵地上拿走了他们可以拿走的轻武器和弹药。

   就在这个时候,有一些缅甸平民,他们被欺骗来作为劳工为日本人服务的,他们发现了躲藏日本士兵的防空洞,估计金光少佐只有700人,大部分还是伤兵和饿得要死的人。其实那个时候他仅仅只有300人,包括病号和伤员。

   无论是夜间、还是雨天进攻,非常奇怪的是都没有成功,而且还浪费了宝贵的时间,这个时候中国人决定还是回到传统的围攻战术方式。在得到了Y-FOS技术人员的帮助下,8月11日中国人开始挖掘松山三角地带剩余的日本人的地盘的下面来解决战斗。重要的战斗在非常狭窄的地方进行,隧道需要挖掘22英尺长,就像矿井一样的挖掘到了日本人地堡的下方。其中一个坑道放置了2,500磅的TNT,另外一个是3,500磅。

   8月20日上午0905,坑道爆破开始,随着工程人员点火爆炸后,火焰发射器手开始发射。在一个地堡里,有22个日本人被活埋,其中有5个被中国人救了出来。俘虏说他们正在睡觉,从没有想到他们这样的下场。0920分,第3团(荣誉第三团)迎着火光冲了上去,借着爆破的优势完全占领了松山剩余的地区。金光少佐的士兵仍旧把持着三角形的一些零散的阵地。战斗持续到8月21-22日。特别是22日的战斗极为残酷,中国人损失了许多连级军官。

   日本人在经过了徒劳的反击后,已经没有力量再对抗失败了。实际上,自从8月18日怒江上新的大桥完成,和大爆炸后的8月21日,日本人的败局就决定了,即使金光少佐是在9月6日死亡,第二天,日本人以烧毁他们的军旗和伤员作为他们残酷的死亡典礼。在松山的1,200名日本士兵当中,仅仅只有9人被俘,10名估计已经逃跑,其他的全部阵亡。中国人以损失7,675人的代价换取了打通滇缅公路。在死亡的中国人中,有5,000名是第8军的,剩下仅仅只有两个兵力不足的团转移到龙陵作战。

   概要

   8月结束时,蒋介石总统对史迪威在中国的指挥是否尊重自己提出来一个“准则”。围绕着怒江发生的事件并没有因为前线的一个胜利而暗示着中国苦难的提前结束,这个时候在中国东部日本人还没有遇到有效的抵抗。日本人在中国东部的代号为“IGHIGO(一号作战)”的作战不仅使得希望尽快打破对中国的封锁的期望停顿,而且意味着将来中国军事和政治形势更加恶化。这些地方作战的失败增加了中美双方合作的疲劳;在怒江和南中国的长沙发生的事件使得华盛顿感觉非常遥远。Defeats in the field place greatstrain on coalitions; events on the Salween and south of Changshawould be felt as far away as Washington.

(注77:根据Y-FOS的文件,Y-FOS1944 历史报告,日本人的研究93,和日本军官的注解,资料来源是:

1.     Carlos G. Spaht上校的报告,CO, U.S. Ln Gp, 第8军来自窦恩将军44年7月29日。AG(Y-FOS) 319.1.

2.     Interv with Spaht, Baton Rouge, La.,1 Oct 48.

3.     有6个中国军参加的怒江战役,但是第8军是唯一准备投入这里的部队。这些翻译的资料包括地图来自Carlos G. Spaht上校

4.     Ltrs, Spaht to authors, 24 May, 29Jul, 24 Sep, 2 Oct, and 28 Oct 47, OCHM.)

5.    


Summary

As Augustwaned, the Generalissimo was committed “in principle” to given Stilwell commandin China.Events along the Salween did not suggest there would be any speedy relief for China by a victory on that front, while in east China the Japanesehad not as yet met effective resistance. Delay in breaking the blockade of China and in setting up an effective barrier toOperation IGHIGO in east Chinameant still further deterioration in China’s military and politicalsituation. Defeats in the field place great strain on coalitions; events on theSalween and south of Changsha would be felt asfar away as Washington.

************************************

US ARMY IN WOORD WAR II

THECHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATER

STILWELL’SCOMMAND PROBLEMS

PARTTHREE

COMMANDPROBLEMS IN CHINA THEATER

XI. THECHINESE TAKE THE OFFENSIVE

X. FACINGTHE COMMAND PROBLEM

THE BATTLE FOR SUNG SHAN

The Battle for Sung Shan

Since theChinese attempt to cut the center out of the Japanese position on the Salweenby taking Lung-ling had failed, the attention of the Chinese commanders hadshifted from Lung-ling to Sung Shan.(75) The hill mass of Sung shan dominatedthe area where the Burma Road cross the Salween and so barred the direct approachfrom China down the Burma Road. The Chinese had invested it with a containingforce in their initial drive on Lung-ling. That drive had been supplied by air,and now that the Chinese were stalled between Lung-ling and Sung Shan, airsupply was not too adequate, and clearing the Japanese from Sung Shan appearedessential.

(77: Inaddition to the Y-FOX Journal, Y-FOX 1944 Historical Report, Japanese Study 93,and Japanese Officers’ Comments, sources consulted for this section are: (1)Rpt, Col Carlos G. Spaht, CO, U.S. Ln Gp, 8th Army, to Dorn, 29 Jul44. AG (Y-FOS) 319.1. (2) Interv with Spaht, Baton Rouge, La.,1 Oct 48. (3) Of the six Chinese Armies to participated in the Salween campaign, the 8th Army prepared theonly detailed and frank account of its role. Theis translated history,including tactical maps, is among the papers of Colonel Spaht. (4) Ltrs, Spahtto authors, 24 May, 29 Jul, 24 Sep, 2 Oct, and 28 Oct 47, OCHM.)

Sung Shan(the name Pine Mountainapplies to its highest peak) is an intricate hill-mass rising to 3,000 feetabove the Salween gorge. It is roughlytriangular in shape. The Burma Road, in climbing out of the Salweengorge, runs along the northeast  side ofthe triangle, angles sharply round its northern tip, then runs back down alongthe northwest side of the triangle. In all, thirty-six miles of the Burma Road were dominated by the Japanese guns on SungShan. Time did not permit building a cutoff road to bypass Sung Shan. The Japanesedefensive system, manned by some 1,200 men under Maj. Keijiro Kanemitsu, wasbuilt around elements of the 113th Infantry, supported by abattalion of mountain artillery, some transport troops, and some tansporttroops, and some engineers. Of the 1,200, only 900 were effective.

In June,during the containing phase, the Chinese had assembled seven 150-mm. howitzers,two 75-mm. howitzers, and two 76-mm. field guns. Later joined by some packartillery, and directed by an American artillery observer in a liaison plane,the Chinese cannoneers dueled with Major Kanemitsu’s gunners. Finally, the Japanesehowitzers ceased to fire on the Burma Road Engineers and the Chinese who werepreparing to rebuild the Burma Road bridge over the Salween.Now safe, the engineers proceeded with their rebuilding. During theis samecontaining phase, the Chinese New 28th and New 39thDivisions had made attacks in regimental strength against Sung Shan. On 15June, they succeeded in taking a peak at the southeast corner of the triangle,but failed to take its twin at the southwest corner, two miles away. Other Chineseattempts failed, though heavy casualties were taken in the attempt.

As theperiod of containment merged into one of preparation for all-out attack,General Wei’s hand was strengthened by the arrival of the 8th Army(the Honorable 1st, the 82d, and 103d Divisions). Originallystationed on the Indochina border, it hadbegun to arrive in battalion increments at the time of the Chinese seback atLung-ling. The 8th Army had some lend-lease equipment, but only twothirds of its officers had been exposed to Y-FOS training efforts. The reliefof the New 28th Division by the 3d Infantry, Honorable 1stDivision, on 27 June was not well co-ordinated, for the Japanese were able toreoccupy the positions the New 28th Division had taken in June. Japanesealso filtered through the Chinese lines to reinforce Sung Shan, and as furtherevidence of Japanese determination, on 28 June Japanese aircraft, threefighters, and two transports circled Sung Shan and made a supply drop, some ofwhich fell in the Chinese lines.

Accompaniedby Y-FOS personnel under command of Col. Carlos G. Spaht, the 8thArmy assembled east and south of Sung Shan and set 5 July for the attack. The Chineseartillery fired a nightlong preparation, and at dawn of 5 July two Chineseregiments attacked but not in strength. A few positions were overrun, the Japanesecounterattacked, and at nightfall the Chinese were back in their initialposition, minus seventy dead. Colonel Spaht reported to Dorn that teamworkbetween the demolition squads and the assault teams had left much to bedesired, that further training was badly needed.

The 8thArmy’s next attempt was made by the 246th Regiment the night of 7-8July. It was directed against the southwest corner of the triangle andsurprised the Japanese defenders of Kung Lung-po peak. By midnight the Chinesehad all Japanese strongpoints in their hands, but shortly after midnight the Japanesecounterattacked over that was for them familiar terrain and drove off the 246thregiment, inflicting more than 200 casualties. Y-FOS’observers reported thatthe Chinese grew quite confused during the night fighting and often shot at oneanother. The 246th Regiment had to be replaced by the 207thRegiment. The 307th faced what was for them a new Japanese defensivetactic between 10 and 12 July. Since the Chinese in climbing up the hillstended to bunch along the easies routes to the top, the Japanese used theirmachine guns to keep the Chinese huddled down in the natural cover the hillafforded, then hurled grenades and mortar shells into the parties of Chinese. Suchtactics were of deadly efficiency, and so the 8th Army brought upanother regiment to reinforce the battered 207th.

Two weekspassed before the 8th Army again essayed an attack on Sung Shan. Thistime, instead of piecemeal attacks by a regiment or two, 8th Armyprepared the attack by moving its howitzers up to pound Japanese positions atfrom 1,500-3,200 yards with direct fire. When the Chinese attacked with threeregiments, on the morning of 23 July, the division commander of the 103dpersonally directed the 75-mm. fire, and on occasion placed shells twenty-fiveto forty feet in front of the assaulting Chinese. Captured Japanese diariescontained praise of the artillery and of the 103d Division’s valiant infantry. Thiswell-led, co-ordinated attack succeeded and dawn the Chinese were in Japanesepositions almost at the crests of the two peaks Kung Lung-po and Tayakou. Alarmedby the successful Chinese artillery fire, Major Kanemitsu on 26 July pleadedfor Japanese air support to attack the Chinese batteries, which had beenemplaced in the open to use direct fire. Japanese fighters promptly responded,and machine-gunned the Chinese cannon and crews. The damage plus the moraleffect halted the Chinese attack for a week, until 3 August.

When the308th Regiment resumed the advance on 3 August in had blame throwerswhich it used with devastating effect to take the crest of Kung Lung-po. Therethe Chinese found several Japanese tankettes, which had been dug in for use aspillboxes. When the Japanese failed to make their usual prompt counterattackY-FOS personnel surmised they might be short of ammunition. This was so, andMajor Kenemitsu decided to raid the 8th Army’s artillery positionsand supply dumps to replenish his supply. Seven parties of Japanese volunteerstruck during the night of 9 August, destroying several howitzers and takingaway all the light weapons and ammunition they could carry.

At  this time, Burmeses civilians, who had beenjmpressed into the Japanese service as laborers and who were found hiding in Japanesedugouts, estimated that Kanemitsu had 700 men, most of them wounded orstarving. Actually, he now had but 300, including sick and wounded.

Havingtried attacks by night, during rainstorms, and by surprise, none of which hadquite succeeded and all of which had taken precious time, the Chinese nowdecided on a return to more formal siegecraft. With technical advice from Y-FOSengineers, the Chinese on 11 August began digging under what seemed the key tothe Japanese positions that remained in the Sung Shan triangle. Significant ofthe closeness of the fighting, the tunnels needed to be but twenty-two feetlong to put the mines in place under the Japanese pillboxes. One mine held 2,500pounds of TNT, the other 3,500 pounds.

The mineswere fired on 20 August at 0905 and the resulting destruction was quicklyexploited by engineers armed with flame throwers. In one pillbox forty-two Japanesewere buried alive, of whom five were rescued. The prisoners stated that theyhad been asleep and had never suspected that they were being undermined. At0920 the 3d Regiment against light opposition took the few strongpoints thatremained on Sung Shan proper. Kanemitsu’s men still held out in scatteredpockets about the triangle. These launched desperate counter-attacks on 21 and22 August. That of the 22d produced particularly bloody fighting in which the Chineselost many company grade officers.

After thefailure of these counterattacks there was nothing left but mopping up. Actually,since the completion of the new Salween bridgeon 18 august and the mine blast on the 21st, the rest wasanticlimax, even Major Kanemitsu’s death on 6 September, and the macabreceremony the next day when the Japanese burned their colors and slew theirwounded. Of the 1,200 Japanese on and around Sung Shan, 9 were captured, and 10were believed to have escaped. The significance of Sung Shan lay in that it hadcost the Chinese 7,675 dead to clear that block from the Burma Road, of which some 5,000 were from the 8th Army,leaving it but two understrength regiments fit to fight for Lung-ling.

Summary

As Augustwaned, the Generalissimo was committed “in principle” to given Stilwell commandin China.Events along the Salween did not suggest there would be any speedy relief for China by a victory on that front, while in east China the Japanesehad not as yet met effective resistance. Delay in breaking the blockade of China and in setting up an effective barrier toOperation IGHIGO in east Chinameant still further deterioration in China’s military and politicalsituation. Defeats in the field place great strain on coalitions; events on theSalween and south of Changsha would be felt asfar away as Washington.


有不一样的发现

0
上一篇 << 美军资料:松山战斗      下一篇 >> 韩国空军祖母权基玉是云南讲武堂…
 
0 条评论 / 0 人参与 网友评论 跟帖管理

关于博主

戈叔亚

欢迎您来我的凤凰博客!

博文相关

凤凰博报微信