山。从地图上看大约是一个不等边的三角形。缠绕在怒江峡谷之间的滇缅公路，从这个三角形的东北慢慢到了正北面形成尖角，然后沿着西北下滑。日本军在松山控制的滇缅公路大约有36英里。时间不允许再修一条绕过松山的公路。日本人的防御系统是在金光惠次郎少校（Maj. Keijiro Kanemitsu）指挥下的1，200名士兵，是第113联队的基本部队，并得到了一个山地炮兵营和一些运输部队和一些工程人员的支持。1，200人中，作战人员有900名。
在由CarlosG. Spaht上校指挥下的Y-FOS人员的陪伴下，第8军于7月5日从东面和南面开始了对松山的进攻。中国的炮兵经过了彻夜的炮火装备，7月5日凌晨，两个团的中国部队开始了进攻。由于兵力不足，虽然部分日本人的阵地被占领，但是日本人马上组织反击，结果到了黄昏，中国人在损失了70多人的情况下，又回到了原来的阵地。Carlos G. Spaht上校向窦恩报告，攻击部队和偷袭部队的配合非常糟糕（that teamwork between the demolition squadsand the assault teams had left much to be desired），要求这样的训练必须马上加强。
8月结束时，蒋介石总统对史迪威在中国的指挥是否尊重自己提出来一个“准则”。围绕着怒江发生的事件并没有因为前线的一个胜利而暗示着中国苦难的提前结束，这个时候在中国东部日本人还没有遇到有效的抵抗。日本人在中国东部的代号为“IGHIGO(一号作战)”的作战不仅使得希望尽快打破对中国的封锁的期望停顿，而且意味着将来中国军事和政治形势更加恶化。这些地方作战的失败增加了中美双方合作的疲劳；在怒江和南中国的长沙发生的事件使得华盛顿感觉非常遥远。Defeats in the field place greatstrain on coalitions; events on the Salween and south of Changshawould be felt as far away as Washington.
1． Carlos G. Spaht上校的报告，CO, U.S. Ln Gp, 第8军来自窦恩将军44年7月29日。AG(Y-FOS) 319.1.
2． Interv with Spaht, Baton Rouge, La.,1 Oct 48.
3． 有6个中国军参加的怒江战役，但是第8军是唯一准备投入这里的部队。这些翻译的资料包括地图来自Carlos G. Spaht上校
4． Ltrs, Spaht to authors, 24 May, 29Jul, 24 Sep, 2 Oct, and 28 Oct 47, OCHM.)
As Augustwaned, the Generalissimo was committed “in principle” to given Stilwell commandin
COMMANDPROBLEMS IN CHINA THEATER
XI. THECHINESE TAKE THE OFFENSIVE
X. FACINGTHE COMMAND PROBLEM
THE BATTLE FOR SUNG SHAN
The Battle for Sung Shan
Since theChinese attempt to cut the center out of the Japanese position on the Salweenby taking Lung-ling had failed, the attention of the Chinese commanders hadshifted from Lung-ling to Sung Shan.(75) The hill mass of Sung shan dominatedthe area where the Burma Road cross the Salween and so barred the direct approachfrom China down the Burma Road. The Chinese had invested it with a containingforce in their initial drive on Lung-ling. That drive had been supplied by air,and now that the Chinese were stalled between Lung-ling and Sung Shan, airsupply was not too adequate, and clearing the Japanese from Sung Shan appearedessential.
(77: Inaddition to the Y-FOX Journal, Y-FOX 1944 Historical Report, Japanese Study 93,and Japanese Officers’ Comments, sources consulted for this section are: (1)Rpt, Col Carlos G. Spaht, CO, U.S. Ln Gp, 8th Army, to Dorn, 29 Jul44. AG (Y-FOS) 319.1. (2) Interv with Spaht, Baton Rouge, La.,1 Oct 48. (3) Of the six Chinese Armies to participated in the Salween campaign, the 8th Army prepared theonly detailed and frank account of its role. Theis translated history,including tactical maps, is among the papers of Colonel Spaht. (4) Ltrs, Spahtto authors, 24 May, 29 Jul, 24 Sep, 2 Oct, and 28 Oct 47, OCHM.)
Sung Shan(the name Pine Mountainapplies to its highest peak) is an intricate hill-mass rising to 3,000 feetabove the Salween gorge. It is roughlytriangular in shape. The Burma Road, in climbing out of the Salweengorge, runs along the northeast side ofthe triangle, angles sharply round its northern tip, then runs back down alongthe northwest side of the triangle. In all, thirty-six miles of the Burma Road were dominated by the Japanese guns on SungShan. Time did not permit building a cutoff road to bypass Sung Shan. The Japanesedefensive system, manned by some 1,200 men under Maj. Keijiro Kanemitsu, wasbuilt around elements of the 113th Infantry, supported by abattalion of mountain artillery, some transport troops, and some tansporttroops, and some engineers. Of the 1,200, only 900 were effective.
In June,during the containing phase, the Chinese had assembled seven 150-mm. howitzers,two 75-mm. howitzers, and two 76-mm. field guns. Later joined by some packartillery, and directed by an American artillery observer in a liaison plane,the Chinese cannoneers dueled with Major Kanemitsu’s gunners. Finally, the Japanesehowitzers ceased to fire on the Burma Road Engineers and the Chinese who werepreparing to rebuild the Burma Road bridge over the Salween.Now safe, the engineers proceeded with their rebuilding. During theis samecontaining phase, the Chinese New 28th and New 39thDivisions had made attacks in regimental strength against Sung Shan. On 15June, they succeeded in taking a peak at the southeast corner of the triangle,but failed to take its twin at the southwest corner, two miles away. Other Chineseattempts failed, though heavy casualties were taken in the attempt.
As theperiod of containment merged into one of preparation for all-out attack,General Wei’s hand was strengthened by the arrival of the 8th Army(the Honorable 1st, the 82d, and 103d Divisions). Originallystationed on the Indochina border, it hadbegun to arrive in battalion increments at the time of the Chinese seback atLung-ling. The 8th Army had some lend-lease equipment, but only twothirds of its officers had been exposed to Y-FOS training efforts. The reliefof the New 28th Division by the 3d Infantry, Honorable 1stDivision, on 27 June was not well co-ordinated, for the Japanese were able toreoccupy the positions the New 28th Division had taken in June. Japanesealso filtered through the Chinese lines to reinforce Sung Shan, and as furtherevidence of Japanese determination, on 28 June Japanese aircraft, threefighters, and two transports circled Sung Shan and made a supply drop, some ofwhich fell in the Chinese lines.
Accompaniedby Y-FOS personnel under command of Col. Carlos G. Spaht, the 8thArmy assembled east and south of Sung Shan and set 5 July for the attack. The Chineseartillery fired a nightlong preparation, and at dawn of 5 July two Chineseregiments attacked but not in strength. A few positions were overrun, the Japanesecounterattacked, and at nightfall the Chinese were back in their initialposition, minus seventy dead. Colonel Spaht reported to Dorn that teamworkbetween the demolition squads and the assault teams had left much to bedesired, that further training was badly needed.
The 8thArmy’s next attempt was made by the 246th Regiment the night of 7-8July. It was directed against the southwest corner of the triangle andsurprised the Japanese defenders of Kung Lung-po peak. By midnight the Chinesehad all Japanese strongpoints in their hands, but shortly after midnight the Japanesecounterattacked over that was for them familiar terrain and drove off the 246thregiment, inflicting more than 200 casualties. Y-FOS’observers reported thatthe Chinese grew quite confused during the night fighting and often shot at oneanother. The 246th Regiment had to be replaced by the 207thRegiment. The 307th faced what was for them a new Japanese defensivetactic between 10 and 12 July. Since the Chinese in climbing up the hillstended to bunch along the easies routes to the top, the Japanese used theirmachine guns to keep the Chinese huddled down in the natural cover the hillafforded, then hurled grenades and mortar shells into the parties of Chinese. Suchtactics were of deadly efficiency, and so the 8th Army brought upanother regiment to reinforce the battered 207th.
Two weekspassed before the 8th Army again essayed an attack on Sung Shan. Thistime, instead of piecemeal attacks by a regiment or two, 8th Armyprepared the attack by moving its howitzers up to pound Japanese positions atfrom 1,500-3,200 yards with direct fire. When the Chinese attacked with threeregiments, on the morning of 23 July, the division commander of the 103dpersonally directed the 75-mm. fire, and on occasion placed shells twenty-fiveto forty feet in front of the assaulting Chinese. Captured Japanese diariescontained praise of the artillery and of the 103d Division’s valiant infantry. Thiswell-led, co-ordinated attack succeeded and dawn the Chinese were in Japanesepositions almost at the crests of the two peaks Kung Lung-po and Tayakou. Alarmedby the successful Chinese artillery fire, Major Kanemitsu on 26 July pleadedfor Japanese air support to attack the Chinese batteries, which had beenemplaced in the open to use direct fire. Japanese fighters promptly responded,and machine-gunned the Chinese cannon and crews. The damage plus the moraleffect halted the Chinese attack for a week, until 3 August.
When the308th Regiment resumed the advance on 3 August in had blame throwerswhich it used with devastating effect to take the crest of Kung Lung-po. Therethe Chinese found several Japanese tankettes, which had been dug in for use aspillboxes. When the Japanese failed to make their usual prompt counterattackY-FOS personnel surmised they might be short of ammunition. This was so, andMajor Kenemitsu decided to raid the 8th Army’s artillery positionsand supply dumps to replenish his supply. Seven parties of Japanese volunteerstruck during the night of 9 August, destroying several howitzers and takingaway all the light weapons and ammunition they could carry.
At this time, Burmeses civilians, who had beenjmpressed into the Japanese service as laborers and who were found hiding in Japanesedugouts, estimated that Kanemitsu had 700 men, most of them wounded orstarving. Actually, he now had but 300, including sick and wounded.
Havingtried attacks by night, during rainstorms, and by surprise, none of which hadquite succeeded and all of which had taken precious time, the Chinese nowdecided on a return to more formal siegecraft. With technical advice from Y-FOSengineers, the Chinese on 11 August began digging under what seemed the key tothe Japanese positions that remained in the Sung Shan triangle. Significant ofthe closeness of the fighting, the tunnels needed to be but twenty-two feetlong to put the mines in place under the Japanese pillboxes. One mine held 2,500pounds of TNT, the other 3,500 pounds.
The mineswere fired on 20 August at 0905 and the resulting destruction was quicklyexploited by engineers armed with flame throwers. In one pillbox forty-two Japanesewere buried alive, of whom five were rescued. The prisoners stated that theyhad been asleep and had never suspected that they were being undermined. At0920 the 3d Regiment against light opposition took the few strongpoints thatremained on Sung Shan proper. Kanemitsu’s men still held out in scatteredpockets about the triangle. These launched desperate counter-attacks on 21 and22 August. That of the 22d produced particularly bloody fighting in which the Chineselost many company grade officers.
After thefailure of these counterattacks there was nothing left but mopping up. Actually,since the completion of the new Salween bridgeon 18 august and the mine blast on the 21st, the rest wasanticlimax, even Major Kanemitsu’s death on 6 September, and the macabreceremony the next day when the Japanese burned their colors and slew theirwounded. Of the 1,200 Japanese on and around Sung Shan, 9 were captured, and 10were believed to have escaped. The significance of Sung Shan lay in that it hadcost the Chinese 7,675 dead to clear that block from the Burma Road, of which some 5,000 were from the 8th Army,leaving it but two understrength regiments fit to fight for Lung-ling.
As Augustwaned, the Generalissimo was committed “in principle” to given Stilwell commandin